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Some Common Misconceptions
About the Profits Tax
ROBERT M. WESTON*
Over a year has passed since President Roosevelt first "in-
vited the attention of Congress" to the plan of taxing corpora-
tions on undistributed profits,1 in lieu of conventional corporate
taxes.2 The business community, it will be remembered, reacted
to the plan by violent and unanimous protest,' subsequently
echoed on the senate floor;4 and as a result, a "compromise"
Revenue Act was evolved,5 which, it seems, will be continued
without change for another year.'
Several lawyers, accountants, and other "tax experts" have
examined and explained the provisions of law implementing the
profits tax in the 1936 Act.' The majority of these commen-
tators have found hardships and inequities to taxpayers in spe-
* LL..B., Ohio State University, Member of New York Bar.
1 The term "profits tax" will be used hereafter as a convenient expression
meaning "the graduated tax on undistributed net income of corporations."
The term "effective" profits tax hereafter used means a profits tax with rates
steeply graduated, leaving corporations no alternative to distribution.
2 Including the normal or "flat" rate on corporate income, and the capital
stock-excess profits tax.
a As recorded at the Hearings on the proposed tax bill before House and
Senate Committees (Hearings before Committee on Ways and Means, Hear-
ings before Committee on Finance, on H.R. 12395; Gov't Printing Office,
1936); and in periodicals, speeches, etc., March 3o-June 30, 1936, sum-
marized in 14-5 Tax Mag. 299 (May, 1936) and monthly issues thereafter.
Some protest was undoubtedly due to a priori distrust of the Administration,
of novel ideas generally, and of- novel tax measures particularly.
' See Congressional Record beginning with the issue of June 5, 1936, at
p. 9179, et sey., Senator Walsh and others.
' The Revenue Act of 1936, P.L. No. 740, 74 th Congress, znd Session
(June ?2, 1936) ; hereafter called the "1936 Act."
6 According to three Government press releases, summarized in New York
Herald-Tribune editorial, May 5, 1937-
7Section 14, entitled "Surtax on Undistributed Profits." Among others,
see Hendricks The Surtax on Undistributed Profits of Corporations, 46 Yale
L.J. 19, at 49; Cochran, Scientific Tax Reduction (Funk & Wagnalls, 1937),
p. 187; Paul, Studies in Federal Taxation (Callaghan, 1937), p. 76; Mont-
gomery, Federal Income Tax Handbook, z936-37 (Ronald Press, 1937),
preface, p. V, also p. 701, et sey.
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cific situations, and have thus concluded against the "principle"
or "policy" of profits taxation in general. The Treasury De-
partment, on the other hand, has been content to rest its case for
the profits tax chiefly on the basis that it would eliminate three
minor' hardships and inequities in the conventional tax system.
Less casual study shows that imposition of an effective profits
tax would have important and far-reaching results not only in
shifting tax burdens, but in influencing matters of general econ-
omy, social and political policy, and corporate practice. These
matters have been touched on,' but not thoroughly explored.
It would seem that the Treasury Department, in the first
instance, should have taken the laboring oar, in stating the
principles and policies involved in profits taxation, and the
objectives sought, especially if, as seems probable, new plans
for profits taxation will be advocated for 1938.10 In the absence
of such statements, the present negative public reaction based
partly on misconception of the issues, is to be expected.
I. Defining the profits tax idea.
Montgomery" and other authorities"2 do not dispel a cur-
s' It is intended to suggest that, in comparison with the sweeping nature
of the change proposed, and in view of the importance of the income tax in
shaping corporate policy, the matters cited for correction (see President's
Message, reprinted in H.R. Report No. 2475, 74 th Cong., 2nd Session) were
of minor importance.
E.g., a hint from the President in a speech at Boston, October 21, 1936:
"We have made it harder for big corporations to retain the huge undistributed
profits with which they gobble up small business." (N. Y. Times, Oct. 22,
1936, p. 14). The most discerning comments to date are by Prof. Benj.
Graham, op. cit., infra, note 2o; Prof. Donald W. Gilbert, Should the Undis-
tributed Profits Tax Be Repealed?, 14-12 Tax Mag., p. 710 (Dec., 1936).
" Cf. Arthur H. Kent, Ass't Gen. Counsel, Treas. Dept., 15-4 Tax Mag.
204 (April 1937), at p. 246, mentioning the "reduction and perhaps ultimate
removal of the present normal tax on corporations."
" Robert A. Montgomery, Federal Income Tax Handbook, z936-z937
(Ronald Press, 1936), p. 703; "As (sic) one of the so-called social objectives
of the new tax provisions, according to the President, was the forcing of
corporate surpluses into the hands of the stockholders." The meaning of this
sentence is not dear; it is taken that Montgomery speaks of pre-existing sur-
pluse. It is noted that neither the President nor any other proponent of the
tax disclosed any social objectives therefor; particularly, any objective con-
nected with the shift of corporate surplus.
'.2 E.g., Godfrey N. Nelson, The Taxation of Corporate Surplus, Vol.
15-I, Tax Mag. p. 15 (January 1937); also comment in tax column of the
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rent notion that the profits tax in some way affects existing
corporate surplus. This idea commonly inheres in newspaper
characterization of the tax as a "surplus tax," or a "tax on sav-
ings," and in statements that the tax effects a "redistribution of
wealth"13 the government, in drafting specific legislation,
sought to create a directly contrary impression, that the tax is
laid "on the net income of corporations" (this being the pro-
fessed subject of the tax) "in an amount measured by the un-
distributed net income." 4 There is, apparently, confusion as to
the incidence of the profits tax-the "levy effected thereby-
from the economic viewpoint.
Under a profits tax two factors must be present before the
corporation is personally liable for tax. The first may be con-
sidered a "condition precedent." The corporation must have
"realized"'" net income. Where there is no corporate income,
or where there is a loss, there is no liability tax. It is immedi-
ately clear that the tax does not fall on corporate surplus, or
other capital, from the economic point of view. 6 It may be dis-
tinguished, in this respect, from various levies at flat rates ad
valorem against corporations, such as "excises" on capital stock,'
and "franchise" taxes measured by capital stock, 8 where mere
ownership of capital gives rise to tax.
The second factor in the profits tax may be considered in the
New York Times (Business and Finance section) Sunday, April 12, 1936:
"In effect, the levy on undistributed corporate earnings seeks to impose a tax
upon the equity of the shareholders * * * "
13 Montgomery, op. cit., supra, note i i.
'4 Regulations 94, Art. i4-1, construing section 14 of the 1936 Act.
's See Roswell Magill, Taxable Income (Ronald Press, 1936), ch. I. It
is meant to emphasize that the profits tax does not necessarily involve a change
in the legal concepts of the nature of taxable income.
16 Nor as a matter of strict accounting, since current income goes first to
profit-and-loss, and to surplus at the end of the current period, which presum-
ably coincides with the income tax year.
'T E.g., The Federal capital stock tax imposed under the 1916 Act, Title
IV; and subsequent Acts through 1926. Montgomery, by a process of circular
reasoning, has found that this "amounts to an additional income tax," because
past earnings often determine present fair value of the corporate property."
"1923 Income Tax Procedure," p. 1468.
18 E.g., McKinney's N. Y. Tax Law, Section 9 A, tax on real estate hold-
ing companies.
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nature of a "condition subsequent." The tax arises only if the
corporation does not distribute its net income during the tax
period in which it was "realized."'" Distributions, of course,
need not be made in cash; it is only essential that they be tax-
able to the stockholders."0 The rate of tax depends on the
amount withheld, thus providing a real incentive to distribute;
and the profits tax should be clearly distinguished from taxes
graduated on the basis of amount of net income, for one reason
or another. "1 Thus, net income, and non-distribution of such
income must occur before there is tax liability on any specific
corporation. The economic incidence, or levy, of the tax is on
the subject "net income not distributed" (withholdings).
This fact appearing, it is certain that the tax is not, by legal
or economic definition, an income tax;22 equally, however, it is
not a tax on prior accumulations (capital). The correct concept
is of a tax on a particular ase of income, for income used by
corporations for reinvestment (expansion of corporate capital)
is to be taxed. Since no precedents for such a tax exist, the legal
definition of the tax is doubtful; it would seem to be an excise
" Another unit of time may be substituted for the income tax year; e.g.,
period between due-dates of corporate tax returns.
In dealing with this point, an incidental misconception is noted. This
concerns the failure to distinguish between (a) allowable deductions in com-
puting corporate net income, and (b) distributions; illustrated in the Cleve-
land Trust Co. Business Bulletin, September 15, 1936, which gives the im-
pre.sion that amounts paid out for operating expenses of the corporation are
considered "distributions." Thus, a corporation which spends all its earnings
for research and advertising escapes the profit tax, not because of distributions
(factor two) but because of lack of net income (factor one).
+o Various methods of withholding cash, while passing on tax, are open;
this, of course, is the first method of escaping "harmful" economic effects of
the profits tax. See Graham, The Undistributed Surplus Tax and the Investor,
46 Yale L.J. 1, at p. 5, et seg.
"I Thus, from graduated "normal" tax on corporations (favoring smaller
corporations), and from graduated individual taxes, where income measures
ability to pay.
"" Definitions traditionally concern concepts of receipt, accrual, and reduc-
tion to possession, and the element of use to which income is put plays no part.
Moulton, The Formation of Capital (Brookings, 1935), Ch. II; Beale, Stock-
hollers and the Federal Income Tax, 37 Harvard L. R. i (19Z3); i Paul &
Mertens Laz'. of Federal Income Taxation, Ch. V. Magill, Taxable Income
(Ronald Prezs, 1936), p. 17, p. 191, et se7.
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within Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution, although the
Supreme Court might hold it a burden on property, thus a
direct tax unapportioned.
2. The Profits Tax and the Corporate Entity.
It is dear that corporations will assume a new status under
an effective profits tax; the exact nature of the change is com-
monly misdefined. Thus, a common "newspaper" attitude has
been expressed as follows:
At least by indirection this sort of tax amounts to a disregard of
the doctrine of corporate entity, which holds that a corporation is a
separate and distinctly (sic) legal entity from that of its owners, the
stockholders. In effect such a levy would tax stockholders as co-partners
are now taxed."3
Other commentators create an impression" that the profits
tax springs from certain Civil War income tax legislation,24
under which the gains and profits of "all companies, whether
incorporated or partnership," were included in computing the
taxable income "of any person entitled to the same, whether
divided or otherwise.) 25
Since the profits tax is levied against the corporation, it is
evident that no disregard of the corporate entity is involved.
Whether or not the taxation of stockholders on their pro rata
share of corporate income would better tax equities, the method
is today impracticable," and probably would be held unconstitu-
tional.27 On the other hand, it is equally dear that the corpo-
rate entity is not to be given the conventional income tax status,
23 Godfrey N. Nelson, in the New York Times, Sunday, April 12, 1936.
24 Graham, op. cit., supra, note 2o; 14-4 Tax Mag. p. 235; Note, The
Corporate Undistributed Profits Tax, 36 Columbia L. R., p. 1321.
25 Sec. I17, Act of June 30, 1864, set out in Collector v. Hubbard, 79
U. S. I, at p. 2 (1870).
26 A. A. Ballantine, Corporate Personality in Income Taxation, 34. Harv.
L. R. 57 (I92): "Corporations (have) become so numerous and their
stock so widely diffused in ownership and so frequently transferred that the
carrying out of such a plan as to all classes of corporations would involve for-
bidding practical difficulties." The same conclusion was reached by a Commit-
tee on Simplification of the Federal Income Tax (Proceedings of the National
Tax Association, 1927, pp. io8-i67).2 7 Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920) ; see T. R. Powell, Income
from Corporate Dividends, 35 Harv. L. R. 363 (I922).
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under an effective profits tax. The theory of the former method
has been to treat corporations as entities collecting and owning
income, just as individuals. Thus, under the Revenue Act of
1913 (unchanged in theory by later Act):
* * * the normal tax hereinbefore imposed upon individuals likewise
shall be levied, assessed, and paid annually upon the entire net income
arising or accruing * * * to every corporation * * * 28
This method of taxation would seem adequate to exact a
flat contribution from all business income toward government
support. It breaks down, however, as it conflicts with the funda-
mental principle of the income tax: to tax each individual ac-
cording to the amount of his income, which measures his ability
to pay. Obviously, the principle cannot be applied to the corpo-
ration as an income-collecting entity, for in each corporation
there are several stockholders, with diverse interests in the
corporate income, and diverse abilities to pay. It has, therefore,
been necessary to continue taxing corporations at flat2 9 rates on
their income, while exempting stockholders from the normal or
flat tax on dividends (income already taxed to the corpora-
tion) ."
The fundamental conflict between a flat rate of tax on cor-
porate income, and a graduated rate of tax on individual income
becomes important, as a practical matter, as large amounts of
corporate income never become subject to the individual sur-
tax, 1 and as surtax rates become so high, that the factor of indi-
"
8 Ch. I6, 38 Stat. 114, at 172.
20 Recent slight graduations in rates on corporations are for the purpose cf
favoring small corporations and are immaterial to the matter under discussion.
'0 Montgomery, 1923 Income Tax Procedure (Ronald Press, 19z3), says,
p. 701: "The fundamental fact (is) that the income tax is primarily a per-
sonal tax; the rate imposed upon the net earnings of corporations being, in
fact although not in form, a device primarily designed for collecting part of
individual shareholder's tax at the time the corporation earns the money rather
than when it distributes it in dividends."
" Berle and Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property
(Macmillan, 1933), Appendix B, p. 360, show billions of dollars withheld
from distribution in each year from I922-I9z8 which, for the most part, never
became subject to surtax except through the more or less adequate capital
gains or loss provisions when stock is sold. Leven, Moulton, and Warburton,
America's Capacity to Consume (Review of Reviews Ed., 1934), compute on
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vidual tax liabilities enters into decisions by corporate managers
on the question of dividends.3 2 Thus the tax problem is one of
forcing current corporate income into the hands of individuals;
and the profits tax is a method of accomplishing this result,
rather than a method of taxing income. The viewpoint on the
corporate entity takes a consequent shift; the corporation is no
longer considered the ultimate owner of its income, like indi-
viduals, but is regarded as a distributor of income-a conduit of
current business income to individuals, and non-taxable so long
as it accepts this status by distributing its income.
The above analysis indicates the answer to several miscon-
ceptions about the effect of the profits tax in adjusting the total
tax load borne by business income. First, it is commonly
thought that under an effective profits tax, stockholders as a
class (vigorous entrepreneurs, willing to risk capital to develop
productive capacity) will be discriminated against in favor of
the pure rentier class (non-producers, often characterized as
"parasitical"), with investments in interest bearing obliga-
tions.3 The profits tax will, of course, do nothing of the sort.
The gross income of the rentier class has always been entirely
subject to the recurring levies of the individual income tax,3
a slightly different basis, for the years 1909-1930, and show that the aggregate
holdings have increased materially, which is of prime importance to the indi-
vidual surtax system. (op. cit., pp. io9, et seq.). The Treasury estimated
that, without a profits tax, four and one-half billions would be withheld, thus
not subjected to surtax, in 1936. President's Message, cit. supra, note 8.
32 President's Message, cit. supra, note 8, as amplified by government
testimony in the Hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means )n
H.R. 12395 (Gov't. Printing Office, 1936), Graham, op. cit., supra, note
20, at p. 2. The author of a note, The Corporate Undistributed Profits Tax,
36 Columbia L. R. p. 1321, minimizes this factor in such decisions, p. 3323;
at all events, it is immaterial to the fact of loss of revenues from the individual
surtax, as corporations "save" income which does not ever necessarily appear
in individual returns.
" Dorothy Thompson, "On the Record," New York Herald-Tribune,
May 7, 1937.
" E.g., 1936 Act, Sec. 22(a) ; except in so far as invested in tax-exempts.
The thought that a profits tax will drive capital into tax-exempts (Finance
Committee Hearings, p. 56) implicitly admits that stockholders avoid sur-
taxes under conventional corporate taxes. If a cure is needed, it should be
found in removal of all exemptions. The psychological problem is well put by
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while the gross income beneficially owned by stockholders has,
in the manner above indicated, partially escaped the surtax.
Second, it is thought that the profits tax will discriminate
against income from capital, as distinguished from income from
labor; in every-day journalese, "soak-the-rich.""3 Not so; if
the profits tax causes distributions, gross income from stock-
holdings and gross income from wages and salaries will become
subject to the same provisions of the individual income tax law.
Since the profits tax is designed to coerce distribution of income,
rather than to tax income, and since amounts of profits tax pay-
able by any corporation are within the control of the managers
(thus, ultimately, the stockholders)," no reason is seen for the
suggestion that stockholders should be exempted from tax on
income which has, in a prior year, borne a profits tax.
Erroneous conclusions as to the tax equities involved in a
profits tax thus usually arise from a misunderstanding as to the
nature of the tax, and the nature of the tax problem sought to
be solved. Misunderstandings as to the effect of a profits tax on
corporate economy are of much greater importance.
3. Economic and Social Implications of the Profits Tax.
The gist of the most common, and perhaps the most im-
portant, conclusion against the profits tax is contained in a recent
newspaper column:"7
Paul: "Some taxpayers have reached the point of believing that tax avoidance
is one of their inherent rights." Studies in Federal Taxation (Callaghan,
1937), p. 76.
"' Montgomery, op. cit., supra, note 7, P. 701: "(the profits tax was)
obviously advocated as a 'soak the rich' measure * * * ." It should be added
that when a profits tax is imposed in addition to conventional corporate taxes,
the stockholding class is taxed disproportionately.
31 Except in certain specific cases, e.g., where outstanding contracts
prohibit dividend payments, which can usually be avoided by the device of
stock dividends, and which, in any event, are cared for by specific exemptions.
17 Dorothy Thompson, "On the Record," New York Herald-Tribune,
May 7, 1937. It is interesting to note that statements against the profits tax,
because it encourages monopoly, often emanate from sources which have not
heretofore indicated much interest in that problem, e.g., Nat. Chamber of
Commerce; Investment Bankers' Assn.; Nat. Assn. of Manufacturers (see
testimony at Hearings, cit supra, note 3); Herbert Hoover (cit. infra,
note 53)-
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The measure discriminates against enterprises which are new or
financially weak in favor of those which are intrenched with ample
surplus funds and available sources of capital * * * new and unsea-
soned enterprises, could not accumulate sufficient earnings to attain an
adequate capital position. The usual method of developing small enter-
prises through the plowing in of earnings would be crippled.
Thus, it is commonly held, with little refutation, that an
effective profits tax would operate to the economic disadvantage
of small and medium-sized corporations, in comparison to its
effect on their larger competitors; that new enterprises neces-
sarily grow by "plowing back" profits, thus the tax would
stratify corporations at their present size." The basic concept
which motivates such conclusions is well put by Dewing:39
It is illuminating to look at the life history of a corporate enterprise
as consisting of three great periods * * * . There is a period of youth
in the history of every corporation; there is a period of maturity; and
there is a period of old age and decay. * * * Much if not all of the
capital required for this growth must be extracted from the business
itself, namely, from the reinvestment of earnings.
This concept of the growth of small, new corporations, use-
ful under conditions of free competition in business, where the
older, larger units gradually pass the point of maximum effi-
ciency, does not accord with the realities of today. Conditions
of virtual monopoly now exist in most fields of enterprise; con-
sequently, small corporations, by and large, cannot grow in any
event. Proponents of a profits tax can perhaps conclude, with
cause, that the present essential problem is to prevent further
expansion of large corporations, for it is the large corporations
which today are rapidly expanding, and this at the expense of
38 Cf. Minority Report of the Ways and Means Committee, Rep. No.
2475, 7 4 th Cong., 2nd Session: "This penalty on earnings 'plowed back' into
the business will tend to stifle the growth of small corporations and will repress
the development of new enterprises, since they have virtually no other means
of obtaining new funds. By 'freezing' small corporations at their present size,
and by discouraging new competition, the tax will be conducive to monopoly."
39 The Financial Policy of Corporations (Ronald Press, I92O), Vol. IV,
p. 168.
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the gross wealth left to all other smaller enterprises in the same
fields."
The grouping should be emphasized. On the one hand
there are the 200-300 largest corporations, marked by wide
diffusion of security ownership, and control vested in a small
number of individuals whose beneficial interests in the corpora-
tion are, proportionately, small.4 These dominant corporations
have tended to acquire more and more economic power, in one
or more related fields of enterprise. On the other hand there
are the vast numerical majority of corporations, limited to L
steadily diminishing field, and at present dividing the smaller
portion of the total business income.42 On the realities, it would
seem that if the profits tax actually operated to stop all corpo-
rate growth, the problem of the maintenance of competitive
conditions would not be enhanced.
But on the contrary, it would seem that under an effective
profits tax, the existing tendency toward centralization of power
in the larger corporations will to some extent be counteracted
since in general, large corporations will be more hampered in
efforts to expand capital than their smaller competitors. At
present, large corporations expand by saving income to a much
greater extent than smaller corporations." This conclusion fol-
" Berle and Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property
(Macmillan, 1933), Ch. III, The Concentration of Economic Power, esp.
p. 36 & 37. At the 1924-1929 rate of growth, it would take only thirty
years "for all corporate activity and practically all industrial activity to be
absorbed by two hundred giant companies," op. cit., p. 40-41. Although the
writer has no up-to-date statistics at hand, the tendency undoubtedly persists;
thus Swift & Co. "buys out its 2ist little competitor" (Time Magazine, Nov.
2, 1936) ; Mellon corporations inclusively expand by purchasing the Virginian
Railroad (id., Feb. 1, 1937).
41 Berle and Means, op. cit., Ch. V, VI.
42According to 1933 statistics, over 50% of all corporate net income
went to zol corporations. This is in line with the steady percentage increase
found by Berle & Means, op. cit., p. 37. The same statistics show 53% of
all corporate assets owned by 618 corporations in 1933. 14-4 Tax Mag.,
p. 236 (April 1936).
4' Berle & Means, op. cit., p. 41-42, Appendix B, p. 360. A specific
example is the Aluminum Co. of America, recently sued by the Government
under the anti-trust laws: "The complaint related how Alcoa was founded
as Pittsburgh Reduction Co. in I888 with $zo,ooo in cash . . . out of
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lows from consideration of several practical matters. Large
corporations, with widely diffused stock, cannot declare taxable
stock dividends, dividends in scrip, or use other means of pass-
ing on taxes without cash,44 as easily as the smaller corporations.
Where there are numerous stockholders, such dividends raise
complicated accounting problems, in computation of fractional
interests. The use of such dividends is to a large degree a mat-
ter of stockholder consent; and stockholders in large corpora-
tions, having no personal relationship with the management,
would presumably resist a continuous practice of passing on
taxes to them, without cash. Flotation of securities to obtain
further capital, in the case of larger corporations, necessarily
involves a public offering; a time-consuming operation.
The situation as to smaller corporations, generally, is to be
contrasted. Here a small, integrated45 body of stockholders
presumably agree upon expansion policy. Stockholders can re-
donate dividends to their corporations with scarcely more
trouble than transfer by the corporation of earnings to surplus;
in both cases, mere book entries serve the purpose.4" A policy of
purchasing more stock with dividends may be instituted by the
stockholders." In every way the smaller corporations are more
flexible and can adjust to new methods of saving income for
expansion more easily and quickly than the large corporations.
Finally, and most basic of all, there is a common misconcep-
tion as to the effect of a profits tax on the formation of produc-
Alcoa's $175,000,000 in assets, no less than $155,ooo,ooo represented (un-
distributed) profits . . . " (to the end of 1934, last date used by the Depart-
ment of Justice). Time Magazine, May 3, 1937, P. 70.
4 Note zo, supra.
4' By common locale and common interest in the corporation; a compact,
continuous group.
46 Thus the corporation, formally or informally, declares a dividend, and
the stockholders, by prior agreement redonate without reducing the dividend
to possession.
47 Cf. George C. Haas, Testimony before the Senate Committee on
Finance, April 30, 1936: "In the case of small corporations with a limited
number of stockholders it is almost as easy to pay out earnings in dividends and
have all or a part of them resubscribed by the stockholders for additional shares
of the corporation's stock, as to-reinvest them directly."
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tive capital; it is thought that amounts drained off in dividends
(which the corporation would otherwise have used in expanding
its plant) will be irrevocably lost and that the productive capac-
ity of the nation will consequently decline. The idea will be
treated on the positive side: The profits tax, for the most part,
involves a change in prevailing methods and policies of financ-
ing business expansion, rather than a change in the economic
process of expansion.
The traditional method of corporate growth is summed up
by Dewing:48
The simplest and most evident method of obtaining capital to meet
the expenditures of an expanding business is through the reinvestment
of surplus earnings.
Thus, in accounting procedure, the net results of corporate
operations are transferred at the close of the fiscal period to the
surplus account, and the corporate managers use this capital to
purchase new plants, structures, or other expansion. As stated
by Gilbert:
It has become an elementary principle of economics taught generally
in the classroom that the corporation has made a considerable part of
our annual savings automatic. Regularly the board of directors decides
what part of the earnings shall be paid out to the owners and what part
shall be retained and perhaps invested in new equipment.49
Granting that under a profits tax the earnings formerly capital-
ized will to a large extent be drained off to individual stock-
holders, the first premise, commonly misperceived, may be
established: Most of these earnings will immediately become
available for, and presumably will be utilized in, further corpo-
rate expansion. The indicated new method for corporations to
obtain these earnings will be increased volume of security flota-
tion.
This premise is established by an analysis of the stockhold-
ing class, and what they presently do with their income; thus,
41 Op. cit., note 39, at page x68.
45 Op. cit., note 9, at page 710.
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who will receive the extra dividends? Can we predict what they
will do with the excess income received?
There are uncontroverted Government predictions as to the
first question. On the basis of an effective profits tax:
A class of I6,051,768 taxable individuals would receive a gross
income increase of $4,398,000,000 of which $4,015,000,000 would
be taxable.
A class of 81,977 individuals with incomes of $25,ooo and over
would receive $2,86i,ooo,ooo thereof; thus 2 of i7 of taxable
individuals would receive 65 7 of the increase in income distributed by
corporations.
A class of 9io individuals with incomes of $5oo,ooo and over
would receive $887,000,000 thereof; thus, .oo6 of i% of taxable
individuals would receive 20.I % of the increase in income distributed
by corporations."
Even on the basis of conventional income taxes, it appears
that most stock is owned by a high-income class. Thus, in 1934,
419,481 individuals with net income (i.e., income after all
allowable deductions) of over $5,ooo received over 78% of
all dividends declared. A class of 131,303 individuals with net
income of over $ io,ooo received almost 65 % thereof."'
The division of dividend recipients is fairly obvious. A very
large percentage of increased corporate distributions, under an
effective profits tax, will go to a very small high income class.
Most of the dividends not taken up here will go to a class which
will not need to use their increased income for living expenses.
The second question is easily answered: the high-income
group (with incomes of over $5,ooo per annum) has in the past
saved a very large proportion of its income, and alone con-
tributes almost all of the total volume of savings, which go to
form productive capital.52 No other factors bearing on the situ-
o As reported in 14-4 Tax Mag. 237 (April, 1936).
As reported in 14-8 Tax Mag. 495 (August, 1936).
52 Leven, Moulton, and Warburton, op. cit., note 3 1, Ch. VIII; Moulton,
Income and Economic Progress (Brookings, 1935), p. 39-40. As said by
Gilbert, op. cit., note 9, stock is mostly held by "a high income group of
satiated consumers who save automatically."
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ation,"3 the very large part of cash dividend increases will auto-
matically become available for investment in corporate securi-
ties, and corporate managers, deciding to issue more securities,
will by the same token decide, as in the past, how much expan-
sion is desirable. The indicated pathway to expansion is not the
"simplest and most evident one," and along the way some sav-
ings are lost, as dividends go to individuals (small stockholders,
for the most part) who will use them for consumptive purposes,
and as individual surtaxes are increased. Sufficient to add that
the most noteworthy economic study of the decade establishes
almost beyond controversy that present economic maladjust-
ment is largely due to too much saving in comparison to
amounts spent for consumption, and that sizeable amounts of
income withheld by corporations in prior years have not been
used to expand productive capacity, in any event, but have gone
for inflation of security prices, or enrichment of corporate "in-
siders.""'
Only brief mention will be made of a last important miscon-
ception about the profits tax. It is generally concluded that the
" Except one: the income taxes payable by this group will take a consid-
erable portion of the excess dividends declared under an effective profit tax,
which, of course, is the tax aim in the first place. Former President Hoover
has an unintentionally amusing plan to exempt reinvestments: "I sometimes
wonder if it ever occurred to anybody that one of the important things that
makes jobs and increased national assets is expansion or improvement in plant
or production. That should surely be our social and economic purpose. In
that light it might be a sane thing for the Government to reverse itself . . .
(and grant an exemption from any tax for all income used by corporations for
expansion of capital and other "savings")." (Address of Sept. 30, 1936,
N. Y. Herald-Tribune, Oct. I, 1936, p. 14). It is noted that, for equitable
and practical reasons, an exemption for corporate direct expansion of capital
would have to be duplicated in similar exemptions for partnerships and indi-
viduals. Then corporations and individuals whose incomes went entirely for
operating expenses and other consumption (i.e., too poor to save) would bear
practically the entire income tax load.
"' The writer has not seen any successful attack on the Brookings Institute
studies as to these points. These studies thus furnish a basic justification of the
profits tax idea. It is there found, inter alia, that not insignificant portions
of annual corporate savings are absorbed in commissions and other charges,
purchase of fraudulent securities, and especially bidding up of prices on out-
standing securities. Moulton, cit. supra, note 2z, p. 151 et seyv.; Leven,
Moulton, and Warburton, cit. supra, note 3 1, p. 99-
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tax will discourage the building of corporate surplus, which con-
stitutes a "reserve against depression," and which is in the
nature of a corporate bank account against the "rainy day." For
all practical purposes, the surplus account is today undistin-
guishable from the capital stock account; it may just as easily
be created by capital contributions from the stockholders, reduc-
tion in par value of outstanding stock, or write-up of corporate
assets, as through reinvestment of corporate earnings. The
corporate surplus account does not reflect the liquid assets of
the corporation, readily available for use in times of depression.
For the most part, it represents only the value of capital invest-
ments in plant or structures in excess of value of capital stock
outstanding. Even surplus reserves "for general and operating
contingencies":
* * * will generally be represented by assets employed in the busi-
ness, being often invested in additions to plants.5"
When notions about the inherent virtues of large surplus
accounts are dispelled, it is easily seen that liquid reserves to
any necessary amount can be obtained by corporate managers
through the security market," or through redonated dividends.
What has gone before has perhaps indicated that, in general,
commentators have not examined the facts before concluding
against the idea of a profits tax. Their arguments have largely
been on the basis of abstract generalities (concepts) which have
no meaning or which are inapplicable, under modern economic,
tax, and business conditions. On the contrary various concepts
as to the effect of a profits tax would tend to show that its effect
" Fletcher, Cyclopedia of Private Corporations (Callaghan, 1933), Vol.
I9, . 503.
'6 E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co. announces a plan to issue fifty million
dollars in no-par value preferred stock, the proceeds of the issue to be placed
in the general funds of the company. " . . . the purpose of the financing is
to guard against depletion of working capital in the face of contemplated
expenditures for increased manufacturing facilities." New York Times, finan-
cial section, p. 33, Tuesday, May 18, 1937. A commentator there cites the
profits tax as the reason for using this method of securing capital. The pro-
ceeds of the issue can be divided between capital stock and surplus accounts,
as the corporation sees fit. "Corporation Manual, 1937" (U. S. Corporation
Co., 1937), P. 267, citing Delaware Code.
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would be beneficial; for instance, through the operation of the
tax in securing more publicity for corporate affairs. Thus,
corporations desiring to float security issues for expansion (be-
ing unable to withhold for this purpose) will often be subject
to the scrutiny of investment bankers, and of the Securities
Commission. The exact purpose of the issue (the kind of ex-
pansion contemplated) will almost necessarily be disclosed to
the investor, whether in a large or a small corporation, and
wasteful or fraudulent disposition of funds, through "inside
schemes" and otherwise, will to some extent be curbed.
When examining the merits of specific profits tax legisla-
tion, most commentators are on more solid ground. Certainly
proponents of the profits tax find it difficult to justify their idea,
when it is embodied in a tax bill which no one could under-
stand.57 The tentative approach to an effective profits tax, as
contained in the 1936 Act (together with conventional corpo-
rate taxes) serves to enhance some of the equitable problems
which existed under the older Acts, and works several specific
economic and tax injustices. It is perhaps not too much to hope,
that more skillful draftsmanship will mark the general revision
of corporate taxes that may be expected in 1938.
"The profits tax as originally proposed was embodied in H.R. 12395,
74 th Cong., 2nd Session. In the writer's opinion, Prof. H. L. Lutz has
properly characterized this bill as "the most involved legislation ever recom-
mended to Congress for enactment." The same author has also said: "It
would be presumptuous for anyone to attempt a dear resume * * * (of the
bill) in view of its obscurity. Any summary undertaken by one who had not
been a party to its drafting is likely to be in error, and it may be questioned
whether the draft is wholly clear even to those who prepared it." (Proceed-
ings of Conference on Debt, Taxation, and Inflation; Wharton School of
Finance and Commerce, Philadelphia, Pa.). Nothing in the nature of the
profits tax idea makes it incapable of dear and flexible implementation in
specific legislation.
